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I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Meyer Proctor, a seventy-year-old man, filed a product liability
lawsuit against The Upjohn Company after he lost vision in his left eye.
The jury awarded Mr. Proctor $127 million.1 Such were the facts as
relayed by Senator John Danforth to members of the United States Senate
during a 1994 speech in favor of a tort reform bill.2 However, this
recitation was not an accurate portrayal of Proctor v. Davis and for his
part Senator Danforth never intended his story to be completely correct.3
Rather, it is very likely that Senator Danforth purposely made his
rendition of Proctor v. Davis sound outrageous in an attempt to portray
an out of control tort system, which made it difficult for businesses to
operate under an onslaught of frivolous lawsuits and exorbitant jury
verdicts.4 Anecdotal evidence, similar to the one offered by Senator
Danforth, was meant to encourage tort reform.
Tort law, like many other areas of the law, is concerned with the
proper allocation of costs. Torts are civil wrongs, from the Latin “tortus”
which means “twisted.”5 In modern times a tort is an injury or wrongful
1
CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY,
BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 1 (2001).
2
BOGUS, supra note 1, at 6.
3
Proctor v. Davis, 656 N.E. 2d 23, 23 (App. Ct. Ill. 1997) (The case itself actually
settled for just over $6 million. In reality the suit was a joint medical malpractice suit and
product liability suited filed because Mr. Proctor’s retina had become detached after receiving
an injection Depo-Medrol, a drug not tested for intraocular injection).
4
See id. (reversing trial court judgment against Upjohn); also see 677 N.E. 2d 918, 918
(Ill. 1997) (vacating the prior decision on procedural grounds; and 682 N.E. 2dd 1203) (App.
Ct. Ill. 1995) (affirming judgment against Upjohn as to compensatory damages and reducing
punitive damages award).
5
Edward Coke, Commentary on Littleton, S ELECTED WRITINGS OF S IR EDWARD
COKE, V OL. I (1586) (“Torts” are so called because they are wrested or crooked, as opposed
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act for which an action will lie, distinct from a contract.6 Fittingly, tort
law includes personal injury adjudication. It is fair then, to refine the
prior statement to say that tort law is concerned with the proper allocation
of costs in disputes between injured parties and those who have caused
the injury.
The costs of the tort system are high to both the injured parties who
lose income, quality of life, and often life itself; and to the parties
responsible for the injuries who must pay damages if found liable. Tort
reformers, however, ignore the costs to the injured parties, in order to
decry the costs to the injuring (often corporate) parties. The American
Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) stated that in 2003, the cost of the
United States tort system was $246 billion.7 That amount represented a
34.5% increase in cost from 2000.8 By 2009, the amount had further
increased to $251.8 billion.9
This Article examines several arguments in favor of tort reform
using economic analysis. By using economic analysis, this Article
dispenses with the weak anecdotal evidence and disingenuous political
rhetoric to objectively address the strengths and weaknesses of the tort
system. It follows that an objective analysis, not political rhetoric, ought
to determine whether there is truly a need to reform the tort system.
Part II examines the goals of tort law from an economic perspective.
Part II analyzes the work of Judge Guido Calabresi who distilled the aims
of tort law down into three articulable goals. Additionally, Part II
analyzes a framework created by the author for objectively examining the
effects of tort reform. Part III begins with a brief history of the tort reform
movement. Furthermore, Part III discusses several of the major
arguments employed in support of tort reform. Finally, this Article
address several methods of tort reform that are often suggested or
implemented by various states.
Part IV addresses several arguments against tort reform. Part IV
examines a theory that tort law, being based on common law, is inherently
more efficient than either state or federal legislative efforts to allocate
injury costs. Finally, Part IV employs the framework developed in Part
II to analyze the arguments for and against tort reform.

to that which is right and straight).
6
Sir William Blackstone, 3 COMMENTARIES 177 (1775).
7
American Tort Reform Association, Facts About Tort Liability and its Impact on
Consumers, http://web.archive.org/web/20100731070852/http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi
7963_howtortreform.html (last visited May 10, 2018).
8
Id.
9
Towers Watson, U.S. Tort Cost Trends 2011 Update, http://www.casact.org/library/st
dynotes/Towers-Watson-Tort-Cost-Trends.pdf (last visited May 10, 2018).
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II. THE GOALS OF TORT LAW
A. Why Have Tort Law in the First Place?
Tort law creates rules for how courts must apportion liability for
accidents. Tort reformers often decry these rules as being unfair to
defendants, and advocate for change. Negligence is the most common
tort claim, and therefore, this Article will focus mainly on negligence
rules and tort reform. In examining whether tort reform is necessary, a
good starting point is whether there should be a rule of negligence at all.
To answer this question, it is first necessary to picture a world in which
the loss associated with an injury falls solely upon the injured party.
Assume that an individual (“Pedestrian”) intends to cross a street at
a cross walk where another party (“Driver”) is making a right-hand turn.
For both parties the cost of exercising no care at all is $0 while the cost
of exercising due care is $10. Further, assume that an accident is certain
to happen unless both parties exercise due care. The cost of an accident
is $100 and there is a one in ten chance that Pedestrian will be injured by
Driver’s actions even if due care is exercised by both parties. If neither
party exercises due care, Driver receives a payoff of $0 and Pedestrian
receives a payoff of -$100. If Driver exercises due care and Pedestrian
exercises no care, Driver receives a payoff of -$10 (the cost of exercising
due care) and Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$100. If Driver exercises
no care and Pedestrian exercises due care, Driver receives a payoff of $0,
while Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$110 (accident cost plus the cost
of exercising due care). Finally, if both parties exercise due care, Driver
receives a payoff of -$10 and Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$20 (the
cost of due care plus the cost of a one in ten chance of an accident
occurring).
Game One Payoffs: Pedestrian, Driver

Pedestrian

No Care
Due Care

Driver
No Care
-100, 0
-110, 0

Due Care
-100, -10
-20, -10

In Game One, Driver employs a dominant strategy where the Driver
never exercises care. By never choosing to exercise care, Driver is able
to reduce his costs to $0. Pedestrian, however, has no dominant strategy.
Pedestrian’s best outcome requires Driver to exercise due care which, as
we have seen, is not in Drivers best interest. As a matter of cost savings,
it can be assumed that Pedestrian will choose to exercise no care as well.
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B. The Goals of Tort Law
The second question that should be raised is: if there is a rule of
negligence, what should be its goal? Judge Calabresi stated that the goals
of accident law are two-fold: first, the goal of accident law is justice; and
second, the goal of accident law is to reduce the costs of accidents. 10 With
regard to the first goal, it is important to note that justice is, by nature, an
abstract concept. Although what is just to one person may seem unjust
to another, justice must be considered a factor in determining what rules
can and should be adopted. Reducing the costs of accidents, however, is
a much more concrete goal which may be discussed with less ambiguity.
Judge Calabresi has divided accident cost reduction into three subgoals: (1) reducing the number and severity of accidents, (2) reducing
societal costs from accidents, and (3) reducing the costs of administering
accidents.11 These sub-goals focus on three dimensions of social welfarethe allocative, the distributive, and the administrative.12 Each sub-goal
should be addressed in turn.
i. Reducing the Number and Severity of Accidents
Perhaps the most obvious sub-goal of tort law is to reduce the
number and severity of accidents. This is torts in its classic role as a
deterrent, influencing our behavior by raising the price we pay for
negligent acts. This role is the allocative dimension of tort law.
Although Judge Calabresi argued that the fault system of liability is
“absurd”13 and “irrational,”14 Judge Calabresi failed to offer a superior
system. Furthermore, an empirical study has shown that the fault system
has had a deterrent effect.15 Accidents, auto accidents in particular,16
have been reduced in part due to the effect of the fault system on
insurance premiums.17
10
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24
(1970).
11
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 26-28.
12
Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi’s “The Cost of Accidents”: A Reassessment, 64 MD.
L. REV. 12, 15 (2005).
13
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 276, 285.
14 CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 276, 285.
15
Posner, supra note 12, at 18-19.
16
Posner, supra note 12, at 19. See also Christopher J. Bruce, The Deterrent Effects of
Automobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 6 J.L. & POL’Y67
(1984); J. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 44
J.L. & ECON. 427 (2001); Richard W. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability
Insurance-The Empirical Evidence, 40 INS COUNS J. 117 (1973); Elisabeth M. Landes,
Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect
of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1982).
17
Posner, supra note 12, at 19.
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Judge Calabresi has further broken down the deterrent effect into
two types of deterrence: general and specific.18 General deterrence
involves attempting to discern the accident costs of activities and based
on these costs “letting the market determine the degree to
which. . .[those] activities are desired.”19 By contrast, general deterrence
treats accident costs much the same as the costs of any other goods or
activities.20 If all activities accurately represent their accident costs,
individuals can determine whether an activity is worth engaging in based
on the cost.21
General deterrence works in two ways. First, it creates incentives to
engage in safer activities, so long as accident costs are accurately
reflected in prices.22 Second, general deterrence encourages making
activities safer.23 Often, this is achieved by encouraging a small amount
of spending for general safety improvements in order to avoid higher
accident costs in the future.24
The second type of deterrence discussed by Judge Calabresi is
specific deterrence.
Contrary to general deterrence, which is
individualistic and market based, specific deterrence is collective and
involves decisions made through a political process.25 In specific
deterrence, all of the benefits and all of the costs (including accident
costs) of an activity would be taken together. Collectively, decisions
would be made as to the manner in which each activity should be
performed and the amount of each activity that should be allowed.26
Judge Calabresi acknowledges that specific deterrence is not really a
feasible or even a preferable means of deterrence.27
ii. Reducing Societal Costs from Accidents
Reducing societal costs from accidents is the second sub-goal of
accident law. Judge Calabresi repeatedly refers to these societal costs as
“secondary costs.”28 This is the distributive role of tort law, which seeks
to answer the question: once the costs have been properly allocated, how
should the costs be distributed.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 68-69.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 69.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 69.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 69.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 73.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 73.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 73-74.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 95.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 95.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 95.
Posner, supra note 12, at 15.
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Compensating the injured party is a fundament feature of accident
law, and to that end accident loss distribution deserves some discussion.29
Judge Calabresi mentions several principal systems through which
accident loss distribution can occur in our society: social insurance,
private risk pooling (insurance), and enterprise liability.30 The merits of
each should be considered individually.
Social insurance is the easiest means to achieve a system of loss
spreading.31 In its most basic form social insurance would involve paying
taxes into a large pot from which injury victims would be compensated,
therefore spreading the loss amongst all taxpayers rather than solely on
the party(s) responsible for the injury. 32 Realistically, social insurance
could be more complicated as we determine whom to tax, at what rate to
tax, and whether there is an income redistribution agenda that we are
seeking to enforce.33 For these reasons social insurance appears
unattractive and would likely be difficult to sell politically.
Private risk pooling, or, more simply put, insurance, is the most
common system of accident loss distribution.34 Insurance consists of
individuals privately or voluntarily pooling money to protect against risk.
According to Judge Calabresi, there are two types of risk that insurance
protects against: the risk of having above average accident costs, and the
risk of having to incur costs sooner than average.35 In private risk
pooling, loss spreading is interpersonal in that those with above average
accident costs spread the costs to those who have below average costs;
similarly, those who incur accident costs early spread those costs to those
who have accidents later.36
Insurance can be pooled at varying degrees of complexity. Different
premiums exist for different levels of proneness to accidents, and
individuals are invited to share risk only with those similarly situated in
accident proneness.37 This flexibility in complexity allows insurance to
effectively serve the needs of the pooling individuals.
Finally, the third possible means of accident loss distribution is
through enterprise liability.38 Under Judge Calabresi’s model, enterprise
liability consists of two seemingly dissimilar systems of achieving
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 44-45.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 44-45.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 46.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 46.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 46.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 47.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 48.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 48.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 48.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 50.
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accident loss distribution.39 The first system places loss on those who are
most likely to insure, or, if they choose not to insure, those who are able
to bear the cost without secondary loss (i.e. those parties who are able to
self-insure).40
Enterprise liability also consists of a second system, which does not
resemble the first system. The second system of accident loss distribution
involves placing losses on those who are in a position to pass part of the
loss on to purchasers of their products as a “pass-through” cost.41
Additionally, these parties may spread loss through manipulating the
factors of production (i.e. labor and capital) that they employ.42
Enterprise liability is more costly to administer than social insurance
or private risk pooling.43 This indicates a desire not only to achieve loss
spreading, but also to place a cost on the activities the party engages in.44
It follows that we may see enterprise liability used as a system of accident
loss spreading more often in product liability or strict liability cases than
in negligence cases.
iii. Reducing the Costs of Administering Accidents
Judge Calabresi does not have much to say about reducing the costs
of administering accidents. However, Judge Calabresi considers it a
“tertiary” sub-goal of accident law because its purpose is to reduce the
costs of achieving primary and secondary cost reduction.45 Somewhat
paradoxically, he also considers it to be of the utmost importance because
efficiency “comes first.”46
One of the ideal goals of accident law is to allocate the cost of
accidents to the cheapest cost avoider—in other words, the entity for
whom it is cheapest to undertake steps to avoid an accident.47 In Judge
Calabresi’s estimation, however, the fault system allocates liability to
individual parties, instead of groups most prone to similar accidents, with
the result that accident costs are externalized to other groups.48 One
certainty of administrative cost reduction is that a case-by-case jury
determination is the most expensive aspect of fault reduction.49
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 50.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 50.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 51.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 51.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 54.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 54.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 28.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 28.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 250.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 250.
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 251.

TRACZ

2018

2018] HALF TRUTHS, EMPTY PROMISES, AND HOT COFFEE

319

Surprisingly, Judge Calabresi is less concerned the potential
shortcomings of the fault system than he is with “the failure to give
weight to the fact that it costs different parties to an accident different
costs to spread the accident costs, even though they may be equally prone
to that particular accident.”50 Unfortunately, Judge Calabresi offers no
real argument on how to practically reduce administrative costs. In fact,
as Judge Posner points out, Calabresi arrived at his conclusions on the
fault system without conducting any inquiry in to the operation of the tort
system. Rather, Calabresi relied on a priori reasoning and semantics.51
We can assume then, that there may be an adequate means of
administrative cost reduction within the fault system that Judge Calabresi
fails to grasp. It may therefore be the case that the fault system does more
than merely contribute to the externalization of costs. The validity of
these assertions will be explored below in the discussion of whether the
current tort regime or suggested tort reforms achieve the goals and subgoals laid out by Judge Calabresi.
III. WHAT IS TORT REFORM?
A. Brief History of Tort Reform
Over the last few decades, one of the hallmarks of American
Conservatism has been unwavering support for the corrective powers of
the free market.52 Conservatives have been quick to turn to the market as
means to address all of society’s ills including poverty, 53 racial
discrimination,54 and education.55
In this narrative, the market
maintained an ideal state of affairs, which was only upended when liberal
politicians began to introduce the government into areas it did not
belong.56 One of those areas was torts.57
One of the great benefits of the market narrative is that it allowed
tort law to seem apolitical.58 In reality, tort reform is anything but market
driven. Instead, it is driven by a coalition of large corporations, doctors,
defense lawyers, insurance companies, tobacco and gun manufacturers,
50

CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 252.
Posner, supra note 12, at 18.
52
JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO RILL BACK THE
COMMON LAW 7-8 (2004).
53
See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-80 (1984).
54
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS, 42-43 (3d ed. 1994).
55
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 85-107 (1st ed. 1962).
56
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 8.
57
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 8.
58
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 9.
51
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lobbyists and politicians.59 The aim of this alliance is to reduce the costs
of accidents by removing protections for injured parties.60 In other words,
tort reformers seek to lower their own costs by shifting costs to injured
parties by making it more difficult to recover for injuries.
The move towards tort reform began with calls to address a series of
“crises.”61 The first “crisis” came in the 1970s due to large increases in
medical malpractice premiums and product liability insurance
premiums.62 In the 1980s another “crisis” struck, this time due to a
general increase in liability insurance premiums.63 Finally, in the 1990s
yet another batch of “crises” arose, caused by increases in product
liability and medical malpractice insurance premiums.64
Labeling rises in insurance premiums as “crises” allowed the
proponents of tort reform to nationally coordinate their efforts.65
Traditionally, tort law is a state-level matter and tort regimes may vary
substantially from state to state. Yet once the “crises” began to occur,
conservative leaders at the federal level found themselves advocating for
tort reform. The 1994 Contract with America included references to tort
reform as well.66
As a result of the establishment of a coalition intended to achieve
tort reform, combined with a political climate open to the message of
insurance “crises,” tort reform has become institutionalized.67 Groups
such as the American Tort Reform Association, various think tanks, and
state-level reform organizations have helped develop arguments
encouraging reform by persuading legislators and voters of the need for
tort reform. These organizations use their resources to lobby, support
sympathetic political candidates, and even contribute to the election
campaigns of local judges.68 Due to the influence of these organizations,
their arguments are worth examining.
B. Arguments for Tort Reform
Tort reformers have embraced several different lines of argument in
order to achieve their goals. This Article addresses three of these
59

FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 19.
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 19.
61
F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 469-70 (2006).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 470.
64
Id. 470.
65
Id. 471.
66
Id. at 471.
67
Hubbard, supra note 61, at 471.
68
Hubbard, supra note 61, at 472.
60
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arguments. First, there has been an increase in litigation facilitated by
greedy lawyers pushing frivolous lawsuits. Second, juries award
outrageous verdicts in favor of undeserving plaintiffs. Third, the current
tort regime is harmful to physicians who may be afraid to practice due to
the high cost of malpractice insurance. Each of these arguments fails to
stand up to scrutiny.
i. Increased Litigation and Greedy Lawyers
There is a common belief that Americans are an exceptionally
litigious group.69 Indeed, tort reformers suggest that Americans rarely
miss an opportunity to take their grievances to court.70 Some have gone
so far as to make the claim that as a society “we are diminished by
reliance on the court system.”71 Tort litigator Joshua Kelner has gone as
far as claiming that “we are culturally disempowered by the courts, as we
are made less self-reliant, less willing to assume responsibility for our
own actions, and less able to cooperate for the common good. In short,
we are made weaker.”72 Despite the ostensibly strong nature of this
rhetoric, it will become clear that it is hollowed when subjected to facts.
The idea that we are a litigious society is complemented by the
argument that there has been a significant increase in litigation recently. 73
Tort reformers would have us believe that this increased litigation is due
in part to an increase in frivolous lawsuits.74 This argument, however,
fails to consider the reality that the explosion of litigation is based on
legitimate injuries suffered by innocent plaintiffs. This would serve to
undermine all of the arguments in favor of tort reform.
Finally, tort reformers argue that the engines driving frivolous
lawsuits and encouraging the litigiousness of our society are none other
than greedy plaintiff attorneys. Kelner argues that plaintiff attorneys
“have both the skill and resources to capitalize upon an unsuspecting
public and a permissive media in the advancement of their cause.”75 This
argument is often supplemented by reference to the great wealth that
many top trial lawyers have obtained in the course of their careers.76

69
Roland Christensen, Behind the Curtain of Tort Reform, 16 B.Y.U. L. REV. 261, 265
(2016).
70
Id.
71
Joshua D. Kelner, The Anatomy of an Image: Unpacking the Case for Tort Reform, 31
U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 296 (2006).
72
Id.
73
Christensen, supra note 69.
74
Christensen, supra note 69.
75
Kelner, supra note 71, at 250.
76
Christensen, supra note 69, at 270.
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ii. Hot Coffee and the Undeserving Plaintiff
A second argument in favor of tort reform centers on the frivolous
lawsuits. President Ronald Reagan used to speak of a lawsuit wherein a
drunk driver struck a man inside a telephone booth. Instead of suing the
driver, the man turned around and sued the telephone company.77
However, as is often the case, the politically expedient version of the case
does not necessarily match the facts. In reality, Mr. Charles Bigbee, the
victim, and the telephone booth was located adjacent to a highway and
near a driveway. Further, the telephone booth had been placed on the
same spot where a previous telephone booth had been destroyed in a
similar incident less than two years earlier. When Mr. Bigbee saw the
driver coming he attempted to exit the booth, but the door had jammed.
Mr. Bigbee settled with the driver, who may or may not have been drunk,
and sued the telephone company.78 Once the facts are developed,
President Reagan’s story seems to be an entirely different case from Mr.
Bigbee’s experience.
Perhaps the most popular example of an underserved plaintiff is the
famous McDonald’s hot coffee case. In that case a seventy-nine-year-old
woman, Ms. Stella Liebeck, was riding as a passenger in her grandson’s
vehicle, ordered a cup of McDonald’s hot coffee.79 Ms. Liebeck’s
grandson stopped the vehicle so that Ms. Liebeck could put some cream
in her coffee, which she had placed between her knees. When Ms.
Liebeck removed the lid from the Styrofoam cup, the entire cup of coffee
spilled into her lap and was absorbed by her sweatpants, which resulted
in third-degree burns over six percent of her body. 80 Ms. Liebeck sued
McDonald’s for $20,000 to cover her medical bills and expenses.
However, the jury awarded an additional $2.7 million in punitive
damages after it came to light that McDonald’s had received over 700
complaints regarding the high temperature of their coffee products.81
The Liebeck case is often held out as an example of an undeserving
plaintiff; after all who doesn’t assume that hot coffee is hot? Ms. Liebeck
is thus considered to be the recipient of an outrageously high jury
verdict.82 Tort reformers argue that plaintiffs like Ms. Liebeck are
undeserving because their own irresponsibility lead to their injuries.
Once again, the crux of the tort reformer’s argument is centered on a
77

FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 23.
Bogus, supra note 1, at 18-19.
79
See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., 1994 N.M. Dist. LEXIS 2.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 24 (in reality, the judge reduced the punitive damages
award back to $480,000 and it later settled for an undisclosed amount).
78
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highly edited snapshot of a real case. Once this snapshot is given context,
it becomes an entirely different case from the one originally described.
After all, a tort system that “rewards” plaintiffs seeking redress for
injuries like those portrayed by tort reformers would justifiably seem
broken. The resultant “crises” would seem all the more real as well. As
such, the undeserving plaintiff argument is a powerful, albeit somewhat
disingenuous, tool for tort reformers.
iii. Harm to Physicians
A third argument used in favor of tort reform is that the current tort
regime is harmful to practicing physicians. Physicians tend to be among
the most vocal supporters of tort reform, claiming that high rates for
malpractice insurance are a direct result of the tort system and doctors’
practice of defensive medicine in order to avoid lawsuits.83 If such
allegations are provable, it would be a devastating argument in favor of
reform. However, even without proof, insurance companies have
dangled the carrot of lower premiums in order to incentivize state
legislatures to pass tort reform measures.84 The defensive medicine
argument, while potentially sufficient to give pause to some, is wholly
unsupported by empirical evidence.
C. Common Methods of Tort Reform
i. Damage Caps
Instituting damage caps is a popular method used by states as a
means of tort reform. Using this method, states attempt to limit various
types of awards including non-economic damages,85 punitive damages86
and pain and suffering.87 These reforms are often the result of insurance
companies testing a reduction in liability or malpractice insurance.88
Damage caps often conflict with state constitutions because they
violate the right of a party to a trial by jury,89 fail to grant equal protection

Julie Davies, Reforming the Tort Agenda, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 120, 152 (2007).
Stephanie Francis Ward, New Tactic in Tort Reform Battle: Insurer Promises Lower
Rates if Legislature Caps Damages, 2 No. 23 A.B.A. J. E- REP. 4 (June 13, 2003).
85
See e.g. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN § 766.118 (West 2017).
86
See e.g. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (West 2017).
87
Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The CounterRevolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 687 (2008).
88
Christensen, supra note 69, at 271.
89
See Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 633 (Mo. 2012)
(finding MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 is unconstitutional to the extent that it infringes on the
jury role of determining the damages suffered by an injured party).
83
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of the law,90 or violate some other constitutional protection.91
ii. Changes in Liability Rules
A second tactic for tort reformers is to move goal posts by changing
liability rules.92 This includes “making liability less strict in products
liability cases, setting up procedural obstacles in medical malpractice
cases, and providing immunity from suit for certain industries.” 93 The
purpose of changing the rules is to lessen the likelihood of a suit ever
being filed due to the barriers erected by reformers.94 Once a case has
been filed, however, tort reformers seek to change the landscape to favor
defendants.95
The basic fault principle in most tort cases is negligence or causing
harm to someone else by failing to act with the appropriate level of care.96
Tort reformers have sought to move away from negligence by providing
immunity from suit for entire groups of potential defendants. Examples
include the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,97 which would
have had the effect of protecting both lawful and unlawful sales of
firearms while prohibiting suit against gun manufacturers for injuries
suffered due to the unlawful misuse of a gun. Similar immunity was
granted to suppliers of raw materials used in medical implants by the
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act.98
By changing the liability rules, tort reformers can shift the cost of
the accident onto the injured by making it difficult or impossible to seek
redress for injuries suffered. It is questionable whether the immunity
from liability of entire groups of manufacturers of dangerous products
truly serves the purpose of tort law. It does, however, serve the purpose
of defendants.
iii. Limiting Attorney Fees
A third way tort reform seeks to lower the cost of torts is by limiting
attorney fees, specifically by restructuring contingency fees. This is a
deliberate tactic to keep injured parties out of court by making it less
profitable for lawyers to take cases.99 Furthermore, this tactic limits how
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 894 (Fla. 2014).
See Best v. Taylor Mach Works, 689 N.E. 2d 1057, 1057 (Ill. 1997).
Christensen, supra note 69, at 271.
Roederer, supra note 87, at 686-87.
Roederer, supra note 87.
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 32.
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 32.
15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03 (2005).
21 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1998).
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 27.
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aggressively claims are pursued, since aggressive representation is
ultimately more costly.100
This tactic intentionally has the effect of screening low-value
cases.101 Filing fees, expert witnesses, travel expenses, administrative
costs (including the costs of obtaining records, creating exhibits, ink,
paper, etc.) all have to be paid upfront and come out of the lawyers
pocket.102 These costs often add up to substantial amounts.103 Because
law is a business, and like any other business, must remain profitable,
lawyers are forced to weigh the potential cost of pursuing a case against
the value of the case and the likelihood of recovery. The result is that
legitimate injuries with difficult facts or of seemingly low or negative
value (that is, cases that would cost more to pursue than the case is worth
to the lawyer) fall by the wayside.
At the same time that tort reformers seem to be concerned about the
danger to their clients from perfidious plaintiffs and their unscrupulous
lawyers. Professor Feinman points out that there appears to be little
concern about the tactics employed or exorbitant fees charged by defense
firms.104
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST TORT REFORM
A. Damage Caps as a Disincentive to Caution
i. Regulation Through Litigation v. Regulation Through
Legislation
One way of viewing damages is as a form of regulation. Regulation
works by attaching a price to specific behaviors, making it more or less
expensive to engage in the regulated behavior depending on the activity
and social desirability. The assumption is that people will only violate
those regulations if the benefits outweigh the costs.105 In the tort system,
regulation can be achieved by one of two methods: litigation or
legislation.
Regulation through legislation is the preferred method for tort
reformers. By using legislative tools to set the outer boundaries of tort
100

FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 27.
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 28.
102
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 28.
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An extreme example is the Woburn, Massachusetts case at the center of the Jonathan
Harr book, A Civil Action. In that case, plaintiff’s costs (not fees, just costs) rose above $2.5
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awards, reformers would be effectively setting the price for every type of
injury regardless of the acquired manner.106 In the tort reformers perfect
world, tort liability would probably look similar to Game one, above. The
greater burden would fall on the injured party and industries producing
dangerous products would often receive immunity from suit.
This approach abandons any pretext that “the market” can cure any
deficiencies in the tort system. Even if tort reformers could claim that the
market approach is effective, setting caps on damages would constitute
market manipulation. Trial lawyers, insurance companies, and other
players in the tort system are aware of the recent jury verdicts being
handed down for similar types of cases and they rely on those previous
cases when it comes time to negotiate a settlement or bring a case to
trial.107 Damage caps change the market by creating limits on the value
of cases and taking away a critical function of the jury.
It should not be claimed that all legislation is ineffective or
disingenuous. Some legislatures have enacted requirements that not only
limit the number of cases which may be brought, but also ensure that
cases which are filed have a good chance of succeeding. For example,
Illinois law requires that a medical malpractice complaint be
accompanied by an affidavit declaring that the attorney has consulted
with a physician who is knowledgeable in the relevant area of
medicine.108
On the other hand, regulation through litigation serves the market
function by letting members of society—the people most likely to
consume goods and services which cause injuries—decide on the price
that injuring parties should pay those whom they have negligently
injured. The price may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff, but that is to the
benefit of all because it verdicts become tailored to the facts of a case,
rather than the criteria established by a heavily lobbied legislature.
Finally, tort reformers would claim that regulation through litigation is
the cause of unreasonably large jury verdicts.109 However, in the few
cases cited as evidence of such inflated verdicts, most if not all of those
cases resulted in either the trial court reducing the damages, an appeals
court reducing the damages, or the parties settling for far less.

106
See e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (West 1986) (setting the aggregate dollar amount
recoverable by all persons for injury or death due to malpractice at $600,000); IND. CODE.
ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West 2011) (setting maximum recoverable amounts based upon the date
of the injury).
107
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1225, 1247-48 (2004).
108
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2004).
109
FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 41.
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ii. Moral Hazard
Legislation-created damage caps put a ceiling on damages, limiting
the recovery of injured persons. As a result, if damage caps drop but
insurance coverage stays the same, eventually a state of moral hazard
could arise. Insurance works as a means of eliminating risk. For
detrimental risks, the insured person pays a sum certain with the
expectation that if the insured against risk ever does occur the insured
person will be fully compensated.110
Moral hazard is a negative behavior that occurs when a party is
insured and therefore feels that they may participate in risky behavior in
which they would not engage in if they were uninsured. If states or, less
likely, the federal government were to cap damages at a certain amount,
it is likely that there would be a demand for insurance coverage up to that
amount. Not only would this eliminate any need for doctors to practice
defensive medicine, but it would actually allow doctors to take potentially
beneficial risks when treating clients, because the consequences for
mistakes were less damaging, if at all.
B. Existing Liability Rules Limit the Filing and Prosecution of
Frivolous Law Suits
i. Defining Effective Negligence Rules
Since a rule of some type is obviously necessary, the next question
is what that rule should be. Ideally it should be simple and
understandable to laypeople, yet broad enough to be applicable in a range
of possible situations. Put another way, there should be one simple
standard for those who engage in activities that could potentially harm
others.
Let us return briefly to Game One. Motor vehicle liability is
founded upon a theory of negligence. In our scenario the Driver owes a
duty to operate his or her vehicle in the manner that a reasonable person
under similar circumstances would. That duty was breached, the
Pedestrian was injured, and the breach was the proximate cause of the
Pedestrian’s injuries. The typical standard of care for general negligence
is that of a reasonable person under similar circumstances.111 This is an
adequate rule for a system of liability that seeks to perpetuate the policy
that everyone is responsible for injuries caused to others due to a lack of
ordinary care or skill in the management of property.
Assume again the general parameters given in Game one. A few
110
111

A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 56 (2d ed. 1989).
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changes demonstrate the difference with a negligence rule including
contributory negligence. In this case the cells look similar except that in
cell three the Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$10 and Driver receives a
payoff of -$100.
Game Two Payoffs: Pedestrian, Driver
Driver
No Care
No Care
-100, 0
Pedestrian
Due Care
-10,-100

Due Care
-100, -10
-20, -10

The shift from forcing the Pedestrian to bear the cost to a negligence
rule with contributory negligence achieves two things. First it creates a
dominant strategy for the Pedestrian, which is to always exercise due
care. Second, it incentivizes the Driver to also exercise due care as a
means of reducing the potential cost of an accident to its lowest possible
level. In this way the negligence standard is able to satisfy the goal of
reducing accident costs.
But what about a rule involving comparative negligence? In a
comparative negligence system, the party who is the most careless bears
the highest percentage of the accident cost. Again, assume that an
accident has a payoff of -$100 and is certain to happen unless both parties
exercise due care (in which case there is a one in fifty chance of an
accident occurring).
Exercising due care has a payoff of -$10, while exercising some care
has a payoff of -$5. If one party exercises some care and the other does
not, the one who fails to exercise some care has a payoff of -$99 while
the party exercising some care has a payoff of -$1 plus the cost of
exercising that care. When one party exercises due care and the other
exercises no care, the party exercising due care has a payoff of -$10 (the
cost of exercising care) while the party exercising no care bears the full
cost of the accident.
Game 3 Payoffs: Pedestrian, Driver
Driver
No Care
No Care
-50, -50
Pedestrian
Some Care -6, -99
Due Care
-10, -100

Some Care
-99, -6
-55, -55
-10, -105

Due Care
-100, -10
-105, -10
-10, -10
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Game Three offers a more complex range of choices for both the
Driver and the Pedestrian, but once again, under a negligence rule, the
optimal choice for both parties is to exercise due care. As in Game Two,
the practical value of a negligence rule lies in the fact that it incentivizes
both parties to exercise due care. Through these incentives, the goals
observed by Judge Calabresi are satisfied and an effective rule is
discerned. Based on what is learned from Games One, Two, and Three,
a negligence standard is not only a viable option, but an effective one as
well.
ii. Applying Negligence Rules to Tort Reform
With the knowledge that currently existing negligence rules are
capable of creating outcomes consistent with the goals of tort law, it is
worth considering how often those laws are applied. It has been
estimated that only ten percent of Americans injured in accidents make a
liability claim and only two percent file lawsuits.112 Professors Hyman
and Silver have noted that the number of tort filings per 1,000 people
peaked in 1990, while that amount decreased by 5 percent between 1993
and 2002.113 Why such low numbers? Professors Hyman and Silver
provide six reasons why parties may choose not to sue. First, many
injured patients do not realize that they have been injured, or, if they do
realize that they have been injured, the statute of limitations has passed.114
Second, a number of injuries caused by malpractice are not serious
enough to warrant a suit.115 Third, treatments required to overcome
malpractice injuries are covered by victims own insurance.116 Fourth, the
cost of suit is too high, whether monetarily, emotionally or both.117 Fifth,
medical malpractice claims often have poor outcomes, which fail to cover
their expenses.118 Finally, injured parties may use cheaper or faster
alternative methods to resolve claims.119
Given these low numbers, the supposed explosion in litigation as
portrayed by tort reformers seems dubious. In fact, Professor Herbert
Kritzer conducted a study on the screening processes used by plaintiffs’
attorneys in Wisconsin and uncovered some interesting facts. In
112
THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
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Professor Kritzer’s survey, respondents reported 53,584 contacts
requesting legal representation; surprisingly nearly 70 percent of those
requests were declined.120 Furthermore, 80 percent or more of the
malpractice cases were rejected.
These numbers suggest frivolous lawsuits are not flooding the
courts. If anything, these numbers demonstrate that those who have
suffered injuries may be underutilizing the tort system. The ability of
lawyers to selectively choose the cases they accept, as well as the fact the
common law negligence rules that discourage filing non-meritorious
suits, results in very few potential tort cases actually being filed.
C. Limiting Attorney’s Fees Would Result in Less Access to Justice
Reducing attorney’s fees in legal actions is often suggested as a third
type of tort reform. The most frequent payment arrangement used by
plaintiffs’ attorneys is the contingency fee. Under this system the
attorney’s fee is a percentage of the recovery if the case is successful. 121
Ideally, this system allows people of modest or limited means to pursue
a claim that they may not otherwise be able to pursue if required to
provide payment up front.122 Because the plaintiffs’ attorney only gets
paid if there is a recovery, there is an incentive to decline cases that are
weak or unlikely to result in a substantial recovery. 123 Many states
already limit the amount an attorney may recover in a given action.124
Perhaps unsurprising, these reforms uniformly fail to limit the amount
defense firms may earn while representing clients in tort actions. The
effect of this is two-fold. First, it incentivizes lawyers to screen out viable
cases where there is a low likelihood of recovery or where the recovery
amount is minimal. In the process, individuals who have suffered
legitimate injuries are denied representation.125 Second, it incentivizes
well-financed defendants to attempt to make litigation too costly for the
plaintiff to take the case all the way through an extensive trial.
In general, plaintiffs face difficult odds once a case proceeds to trial

120
HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 69-74 (2004); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths
Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 754-57 (2002); Herbert M. Kritzer,
Contingency Fee Lawyers As Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 24
(1997); Herbert M. Kritzer, Holding Back the Floodtide: The Real Role of Contingent Fee
Lawyers?, 70 WIS. LAW. 10, 63 (1997).
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because only 52 percent of cases result in a favorable verdict.126 Thus,
nearly half of all cases result in no payment for the attorney representing
the injured parties. In medical malpractice cases, juries return a verdict
for the defense in 73 to 81 percent of cases.127 These statistics alone
demonstrate that an explosion of frivolous lawsuits is implausible.
However, the tort reform responses have a legitimate tendency to keep
injured parties out of court and thus denying injured parties just
compensation.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Tort Reform Fails to Achieve Either of the Main Goals of
Accident Law
i. Tort Reform Fails to Dispense Justice
“Justice” is an abstract term open to interpretation based on an
individual’s personal views and preferences. Defining “justice” can be
difficult, so it is often easier to describe examples of injustice rather than
examples of justice.128 However, analysis of the commonly proposed
methods of tort reform necessitates a definition of justice. For the
purposes of this Article, justice is defined as the fair compensation of
accident victims by those liable to them for causing their injuries. Even
this definition is flawed (for example, what is “fair compensation?”), yet
it is sufficient for analyzing proposed tort reforms.
Using this definition, the most common types of tort reform fail to
meet the goal of delivering justice to individuals whose injuries are
caused by others. Caps on damages mean that some injuries or losses
may lack adequate compensation, with the injured party being forced to
absorb some of the cost of the accident, while the tortfeasor escapes
paying some costs for which the tortfeasor has been found liable.129 As
part of a common theme, tort reform seeks to shift the cost of accidents
away from injuring parties and onto those who have been injured by the
negligence of others.
Attempting to change the rules of liability also fails to achieve the
goal of distributing justice. No one likes a level playing field; plaintiffs
prefer a legal system that favors them, and defendants and insurance
companies favor a legal system that favors high burdens of proof and
limited damages awards. When the legal system for negligence is similar
126
127
128
129
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or identical to the system discussed above in Game Three Payoffs:
Pedestrian, Driver,130 parties are forced to bear the costs of their own
actions and the landscape is not tilted in favor of either party.
As discussed previously, tort reform seeks to avoid this level playing
field by moving the goal posts.131 Often this means attempting to exempt
entire industries from liability for injuries either caused by their products
or by their actions.132 This is yet another cost shifting mechanism that
intends to relieve the cost burden of accident costs on defendants by
making it more difficult or impossible to hold them accountable.
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, is that an attempt to limit legal
fees not only fails to address the administration of justice, but it actively
seeks to deny justice to injured parties by keeping them out of the
courts.133 Often couched in commercially appealing terms of limiting
awards to greedy plaintiffs and unscrupulous attorneys, the reality is that
lawyers who cannot afford to take cases from which they are unlikely to
profit often screen out lower value cases.134 Of course insurance
companies, defense counsel, defendants, other repeat players, and the
politicians for whom they lobby to pass reform, are all aware of these
facts, however, denying access to justice has been their goal from the
beginning.
ii. Tort Reform Fails to Reduce Accident Costs
The second major goal of accident law is the reduction of accident
costs.135 This includes not just the cost of accidents per se, but also the
cost of avoiding accidents.136 Reducing accident costs is a very broad
goal, which could be achieved in a variety of ways, yet tort reformers
have consistently shown that reducing accident costs as a whole is not
their intent. Rather, they seek to reduce accident costs to their clients,
insureds, and political donors.
As discussed above, and indeed throughout this essay, the common
methods of tort reform do not reduce accident costs. Instead, they shift
accident costs from those liable for causing harm to the injured parties
themselves. This is neither just, nor is it a reduction of costs. Further, it
pushes the accident law system closer to the system we see in Game One,
in which neither party has any incentive to exercise any degree of care.
130
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Needless to say, an accident system in which negligence cases are
treated in the manner described in Game One does not benefit society.
Instead, it benefits a few corporations, insurance companies, their
investors, defense attorneys (whose legal fees would remain uncapped),
lobbyists, and politicians. Incidentally, it increases certain social costs,
increasing those who receive disability because they cannot pay their
medical bills, bankruptcy, and other added costs, which could be avoided
by the liable party being held accountable.
Furthermore, reducing the cost of accidents can be divided into three
sub-goals: (1) attempting to reduce the frequency or severity of accidents;
(2) reducing societal costs of accidents; and (3) reducing administrative
costs of accidents.137 Each sub-goal is discussed in greater detail below.
However, the outcome ultimately remains the same and the common
methods of tort reform fail to reduce the cost of accidents.
B. Tort Reform Fails to Achieve the Sub-goals of Accident Law
i. Tort Reform Does Not Attempt to Reduce the Frequency or
Severity of Accidents
One of the most important ways in which accident law reduces the
costs of accidents is by acting as a deterrent. When the cost of negligently
engaging in an activity is clear, a potential actor will weigh the costs of
the negligent act and determine whether it is more than he or she is willing
to bear. If the cost is too high, the potential actor will refrain from
negligently engaging in that activity. However, if the cost is too low to
discourage the negligent behavior, then there will be no incentive to
refrain from behaving negligently.
Damage caps do not incentivize careful behavior because they limit
the potential cost of negligence. Furthermore, damage caps coupled with
insurance may serve to create a scenario of moral hazard in which the
incentive to act carefully dissipates to the point of near nonexistence.
This in turn brings us back to the situation faced in Game One, where the
combination of damage caps and insurance makes the potential accident
cost so low that regardless of the injured parties own level of care, the
injured party will likely still end up carrying the burden of the costs of
their own injuries.
It would be disingenuous to say that there has been any attempt by
tort reformers to use damage caps to reduce the frequency and severity of
accidents—unless the argument is that incentivizing consumers not to
consume, pedestrians not to walk, and patients not to visit the doctor
137
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somehow achieves both of these goals. This is an absurdity given that
the economy cannot function without consumers, consumers cannot
consume without some sort of protection, not everyone can afford a
vehicle, and medical care is essential to good health. What is really
happening is not cost reduction; it is cost shifting.
Similarly, changing the rules of liability by exempting certain
industries does not reduce the cost of accidents. One of the great traits of
the common law is that it allows us to create new and efficient rules in
order to allocate liability in accidents. This is seen in Game Three, where
the party who bears the most responsibility for the injury bears the most
cost. Using the legislative process to change these rules takes time
(including drafting, debating and signing into law) and may not be
effective at actually reducing accident costs. The existing common law
rules, however, are effective at allocating liability for accident costs.
ii. Tort Reform Fails to Address Societal Costs of Accidents
Tort reform fails to reduce the allocative costs of accident as well as
their distributive and/or societal costs. Three primary means through
which accident loss distribution can occur were discussed above: (1)
social insurance; (2) private risk pooling; and (3) enterprise liability. 138
One of the great promises of tort reform is that it will lower the cost
of insurance premiums.139 For example, insurance companies advertise
reduced premiums and in return legislators make it more difficult to sue
insurance companies. However, this is often not the case even when tort
reform occurs. Instead, insurance premiums stay the same and we can
only assume that the only change is an increase in the dividends received
by those who have invested in the insurance companies.
But that is not all; indeed tort reformers claim that high insurance
premiums deter some doctors from practicing anything other than
defensive medicine.140 However, empirical evidence debunks this
story.141 Towers Watson142 found that between 2006 and 2011, medical
malpractice direct total premiums had decreased every year despite
increases in tort litigation costs.143 This indicates that insurance
premiums do not respond to tort reform as promised by reformers.
138

Supra Section II(B)(ii).
Stephanie Francis Ward, New Tactic in Tort Reform Battle: Insurer Promises Lower
Rates if Legislature Caps Damages, 2 No. 23 A.B.A. J. E- REP. 4 (June 13, 2003).
140
Christensen, supra note 69, at 268.
141
ROSS EISENBERRY, TORT COSTS AND THE ECONOMY, MYTHS, EXAGGERATIONS, AND
PROPAGANDA 6-7 (2006), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/174/bp174.pdf.
142
Id. at 6 (Formerly Towers Perrin and suspected by the Economic Policy Institute of
inflating tort cost numbers).
143
TOWERS WATSON, 2011 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 4 (2012).
139

TRACZ

2018

2018] HALF TRUTHS, EMPTY PROMISES, AND HOT COFFEE

335

While social insurance would be easy to implement, the very nature
of creating a tax for the purpose of accident loss distribution in which all
taxpayers share the cost of accidents would be politically unpalatable to
many conservative lawmakers, even if it might be cheaper in the long run
for potential clients. Similarly, enterprise liability would be a form of
accident loss distribution that would run counter to tort reformers efforts
to exclude certain groups from liability for accidents involving their
products. If tort reform fails to reduce the cost of private risk pooling,
and social insurance and enterprise liability are unpalatable, then tort
reform has not succeeded in reducing the distributive costs of accidents.
iii. Tort Reform Affects Administrative Costs But Only at the
Expense of Justice
Finally, tort reform does have some discernable effect on the
administrative costs, but it is for the wrong reasons. As discussed above,
tort reform has little to do with justice or cost reduction, instead it trends
more toward cost shifting. Yet it also seeks to keep injured parties out of
court. This should be viewed not as a success for tort reform, but as an
alarming signal of political willingness to allow people to suffer injuries
without compensation in order to protect corporate donors.
Potential plaintiffs are kept out of court by attempts to change the
liability rules, damage caps, and limits on attorney fees. All of these
methods make it either impossible to file a lawsuit, or not profitable for
an attorney to pursue justice on behalf of an injured client. While this
does result in a reduction of administration costs, it does not increase
efficiency. The reductions are enabled by reduced access to the justice
system, which is never an acceptable trade-off.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tort reform is not inherently flawed. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes once wrote, “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”144 When experience tells us a legal rule or doctrine is not
working, it is time to replace that rule or doctrine. However, tort reform
as a political agenda meant to improve the lot of certain repeat players,
rather than for the benefit of society as a whole, is not preferable.
The goals accident law should aspire to achieve are reducing the
frequency, severity, and cost of accidents. Unfortunately, the most
common types of tort reform do not achieve these goals. Rather than
reduce the cost of accidents, tort reformers instead seek to shift the cost
of accidents to injured parties by either limiting their recovery or making
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it difficult for them to bring their case in court. For these reasons modern
tort reform is ineffective and detrimental to society.

